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COMMENTS
CIVIL DEATH IS DIFFERENT: AN
EXAMINATION OF A POST-GRAHAM
CHALLENGE TO FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT UNDER THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Sarah C. Grady*
“A man without a vote is a man without protection. He is virtually helpless.” Out of
1
such feelings of helplessness were revolutions born.

Since the founding, the United States has struggled with the question
of who should be permitted to vote. In their first days as political
communities, some states required prospective voters to adhere to specified
religions in order to qualify.2 As conceptions of citizenship changed
throughout history, various groups began to lobby for inclusion into the
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1
RANDALL B. WOODS, LBJ: ARCHITECT OF AMERICAN AMBITION 330 (2002) (quoting
then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson in a statement he gave to the press shortly after the
approval of the Civil Rights Act of 1957).
2
Jason Schall, The Consistency of Felon Disenfranchisement with Citizenship Theory, 22
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 53, 57 n.36 (2006). Quakers, Catholics, and Jews were sometimes
denied the franchise. Id. As late as 1777, Vermont enforced religious restrictions on the
voting franchise. Alec C. Ewald, An “Agenda for Demolition”: The Fallacy and the Danger
of the “Subversive Voting” Argument for Felony Disenfranchisement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 109, 120 n.37 (2004). However, this practice was largely abandoned with the
adoption of the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights in 1791. See id. at 119–20; see also
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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franchise.3 Proponents of disenfranchisement schemes justified their
exclusions on many bases, but most often relied on popular rhetoric
suggesting the groups were second-class citizens, not worthy of the honor
of the ballot box.4 In the end, those fighting for suffrage carried the day,
and the United States modified its laws to include them.5 There is one
group, however, which has still not attained nationwide suffrage: previously
convicted felons.
This Comment argues for the abolition of the most extreme form of
felon disenfranchisement in the United States—Virginia’s lifetime
disenfranchisement of all individuals convicted of any felony—through the
framework of an Eighth Amendment challenge. Part I will discuss the
history of this practice, including pre-American justifications for stripping
various groups of the right to vote, and analyze the history of past
challenges to such schemes. Part II will argue that, given prior case law and
the nature of Virginia’s provision, the Eighth Amendment is the best
vehicle to challenge the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement.
Finally, Part III will apply the analysis articulated by the Graham Court and
argue that the Eighth Amendment requires invalidation of Virginia’s
provision because it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by
the Constitution.
I. A HISTORY OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT
A. THE ORIGINS OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT

The phenomenon of disenfranchisement has a long history reaching
back to ancient and medieval times. However, its current form in the
United States is both overinclusive (in terms of the population upon whom
disenfranchisement is imposed) and underinclusive (in terms of the range of
sanctions imposed upon the affected population). Moreover, when the
practice was originally brought to the United States from Europe,
3

See Schall, supra note 2, at 70 (discussing the role liberalism plays in the modern
conception of voting as a right, important both inherently and as a protector of a panoply of
other substantive rights).
4
ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS 3 (1997). There is one interesting exception: women.
Although some of the anti-Suffragette rhetoric contained overtones of “women-as-secondclass-citizens,” the most popular argument against including women in the franchise
centered on the notion that politics were dirty and corrupt, and women were too delicate to
be exposed to the crooked business. See id.
5
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting exclusion from voting on the basis
of race); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1 (granting women the right to vote); U.S. CONST.
amend. XXIV, § 1 (prohibiting poll taxes in federal elections); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI,
§ 1 (lowering the voting age to eighteen years).
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permanent disenfranchisement was limited to a discrete range of crimes, all
closely related to the exercise of the franchise itself. Ultimately, no legal
tradition, domestic or foreign, imposed the broad disenfranchisement
provisions that currently exist in Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, and Virginia
today. Part I.A.1 will discuss the ancient history of disenfranchisement,
while Part I.A.2 will discuss the implementation of disenfranchisement in
early American history.
1. Ancient History
The disenfranchisement of felons long predates the birth of America
and traces its roots to ancient Greece and Rome, where criminals were
branded with the status of atimia or infamia, depriving them of all of their
rights and privileges including the right to vote.6 The Greeks and Romans
dearly coveted these political rights, and losing them was equated with a
loss of honor and one’s position as a citizen in society.7 As such, the threat
of this loss was an effective way to deter criminal behavior.8 Centuries
later, European states adopted a similar condition called “outlawry,” which
deprived certain criminals of all legal protections.9 These criminals were
essentially expelled from the political community, losing even the right of
legal protection from murder by other citizens.10 The underlying crime was
considered a war on the community, and outlawry was justified as a
necessary response by the community to assert its control.11
In England, “outlawry” developed into the concept of “attainder” or
“civil death.”12 All of the criminal’s property was returned to the control of
the king.13 The “attainted criminal was said to be ‘dead in law’ because he

6
ENGIN F. ISIN, BEING POLITICAL 82 (2002); Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen,
Punishment and Democracy: The Disenfranchisement of Nonincarcerated Felons in the
United States, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 491, 492 (2004).
7
Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One’s Debt to Society: The German
Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753, 757 (2000).
8
Mark E. Thompson, Comment, Don’t Do the Crime if You Ever Intend to Vote Again:
Challenging the Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 167, 172 (2002).
9
Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1060 (2002).
10
Id.
11
See Thompson, supra note 8, at 172. This justification bears a resemblance to a
modern defense of felon disenfranchisement laws—that felons have broken the social
contract, and therefore do not possess the moral competence to participate in elections.
12
Schall, supra note 2, at 54.
13
Id.
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could not perform any legal function—including, of course, voting.”14
Civil death, like atimia and infamia, served as a deterrent “because the
stigma of the loss of civil rights in the small communities of those times
increased the humiliation and isolation suffered by the offender and his
family and served as a warning to the rest of the community.”15 It was used
sparingly, however. As Blackstone explained, civil death was used only
“when it is . . . clear beyond all dispute, that the criminal is no longer fit to
live upon the earth, but is to be exterminated as a monster and a bane to
human society.”16
2. Taking Disenfranchisement to America
English colonists brought the tradition of civil death with them to
America.17 As time passed and colonies began to adjust the old common
law to meet their own needs, many of the deprivations that attached with
civil death were discarded.18 Disenfranchisement for criminal activity,
however, remained firmly established in early American law. In the preRevolution colonies, even established citizens could lose their “freeman”
status if they exhibited behavior characterized as “grossly scandalouse, or
notoriously vitious.”19
While some colonies merely indicated that
misbehavior would result in general loss of freedom, others more directly
targeted voting.20 In Connecticut, for example, a freeman who had been

14

Ewald, supra note 9, at 1060. Ewald notes that the English infliction of “civil death”
was reserved for a small number of very serious crimes and had to be implemented by
judicial pronouncement. Id. at 1060–61.
15
Angela Behrens, Note, Voting—Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and
Legislative Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231, 236
(2004) (quoting Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender’s Right
to Vote: Background and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 726–27 (1973)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Behrens notes that an imposition of civil death was an alternative,
rather than an addition, to other forms of public punishment, such as hanging and mutilation.
Id. at 236 n.30.
16
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373.
17
William Walton Liles, Commentary, Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws:
Past, Present, and Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615, 617 (2007).
18
For example, as the criminal code evolved in the early colonies, many of the civil
prohibitions—e.g., inability to enter into contracts, inability to own property—were
eliminated. See id.
19
Cortlandt F. Bishop, History of Elections in the American Colonies, in 3 STUDIES IN
HISTORY ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 1, 55 (Univ. Faculty of Political Sci. of Columbia
Coll. ed., 1893).
20
Id.
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“scandalous” was disenfranchised until “good behaviour shall cause
restoration of the privilege.”21 The Code of 1650 similarly dictated that:
if any person within these Libberties haue beene or shall be fyned or whipped for any
scandalous offence, hee shall not bee admitted after such time to haue any voate in the
Towne or Commonwealth, nor to serue in the Jury, vntill the Courte shall manifest
22
theire satisfaction.

Massachusetts explicitly announced that disenfranchisement was to be
imposed for “fornication or any shamefull and vitious crime” or “any evill
carriage agnt ye gouernments or churches.”23 Yet, while most of these laws
conferred substantial discretion as to when suffrage could be regained, few
envisioned permanent deprivation.24 Those laws that did call for lifetime
disenfranchisement generally only allowed it after a conviction for an
offense closely related to the exercise of the franchise itself.25
The drafters of these early provisions and the governmental bodies in
charge of their enforcement did not specify the purpose of the
disenfranchisement penalties.26 These laws might simply be viewed as the
direct descendants of their English forefathers, unquestionably penal in
nature and used to punish and deter criminal behavior.27 On the other hand,
the original unamended Constitution did not protect any voting rights,28
except requiring an election for candidates to the House of
Representatives29 and allowing states to dictate the time, place, and manner
for holding elections for congressional representatives.30 These two clauses
taken together suggest that access to the ballot box followed the theme of
early American law: the Founding Fathers conferred to the states plenary
21

Id. (quoting ACTS AND LAWS OF HIS MAGESTIE’S COLONY OF CONNECTICUT IN NEW
ENGLAND 40 (1702)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22
Id. (quoting 1 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 559 (J. Hammond
Trumble ed., 1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23
Id. at 55–56 (quoting MASSACHUSETTS COLONIAL RECORDS, pt. II, 562, 110) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
24
Ewald, supra note 9, at 1062. While some smaller communities within the colonies,
like Plymouth, imposed permanent disenfranchisement, few required it for the entire colony.
Instead, colonies like Massachusetts and Connecticut left the decision of when to restore
voting rights to the court. Id.
25
Id. Ewald notes that in Rhode Island, lifetime disenfranchisement was only triggered
once a person was convicted of bribing an election official or of possessing a false deed
(since owning property was at the time a prerequisite to ballot access). Id.
26
Thompson, supra note 8, at 173.
27
Id.
28
See John R. Cosgrove, Four New Arguments Against the Constitutionality of Felony
Disenfranchisement, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 157, 165 (2004).
29
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
30
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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authority over the franchise while explicitly limiting the powers given to the
national government.31
Indeed, a quick survey of early American history sheds some light on
what concept of suffrage the Framers had in mind. John Adams and James
Madison supported granting the franchise to only white landowning males,
worrying that universal white suffrage might allow “the rights of property
or the claims of justice . . . [to] be overruled by a majority without property,
or interested in measures of justice.”32 Even Thomas Jefferson and Daniel
Webster, whose visions of suffrage were more expansive, called for the
suffrage of men who in some way affirmatively contributed to the
government through ownership of property, participation in the army, or by
paying taxes.33 These views of suffrage saw voting as a privilege rather
than a right, and it is altogether possible that the Framers intended to leave
the matter of voter qualifications entirely to the states. It is no surprise
then, that eighteenth-century America extended the franchise to propertyowning white males alone.34
As notions of political equality developed in the United States,
however, access to the ballot box began to expand.35 In the early nineteenth
century, land ownership requirements fell away and were replaced by less
onerous poll taxes.36 In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified,
welcoming black men to the franchise.37 In 1920, women were added to the
voting rolls.38 In 1964, the poll tax was abolished,39 and in 1971, the United
States allowed all citizens age eighteen and over to vote.40

31

See S. Brannon Latimer, Can Felon Disenfranchisement Survive Under Modern
Conceptions of Voting Rights?: Political Philosophy, State Interests, and Scholarly Scorn,
59 SMU L. REV. 1841, 1842 (2006).
32
James Madison, Note to his Speech on the Right of Suffrage, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 450, 450 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
33
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 210, 212 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999).
34
Latimer, supra note 31, at 1842.
35
Id. at 1842–43.
36
Id. at 1842.
37
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
38
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1.
39
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
40
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. Interestingly, Pamela Karlan has argued that the
extension of the voting franchise to new groups has been influenced by the United States’
engagements in war. Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the
Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2003). According to Karlan, participation in a
war effort, either by fighting directly or contributing at home, strengthens the affected
group’s claim to full participation in democratic government. Id.
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Yet even as the voting rolls have become more diverse, there is one
group whose claim to nationwide suffrage continues to be ignored: felons.
Contrary to the general trend of expansion, felon disenfranchisement
actually gained momentum in the early years of American history.41 In
1840, only four of the existing twenty-four states had codified felon
disenfranchisement schemes,42 but by “the eve of the Civil War, some two
dozen states had statutes barring felons from voting or had . . . [similar]
provisions in their state constitutions.”43 This change increased its speed in
the years immediately following the Civil War.44 By 1870, twenty-eight of
the thirty-eight states deprived citizens of the vote based on a felony
conviction.45 Many have noted that this increase is largely due to the fact
that southern states used criminal disenfranchisement provisions to prohibit
black men from access to the ballot, otherwise barred by the Fifteenth
Amendment.46
In addition to the increase in the number of states that enacted
disenfranchisement provisions during this time, the nature of those
provisions also changed.47 Rather than limiting the penalty to offenders
who committed a discrete group of crimes relevant to the exercise of the
franchise, states began to enact much broader provisions.48 These
provisions took a harsh tone, requiring an executive pardon to be returned
to suffrage if they provided for a return at all.49
It was not until the 1950s that advocates began to challenge felon
disenfranchisement schemes, as part of a wider agenda to change the focus
of the American penal system from retribution to rehabilitation and

41

Manza & Uggen, supra note 6, at 492.
Id.
43
Liles, supra note 17, at 617 (quoting Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic
Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67
AM. SOC. REV. 777, 781 (2002)).
44
Behrens, supra note 15, at 237.
45
Id.
46
See, e.g., Ewald, supra note 9, at 1065 (noting that “several Southern states carefully
re-wrote their criminal disenfranchisement provisions with the express intent of excluding
blacks from the suffrage”); Latimer, supra note 31, at 1843 (explaining the various ways that
“Southern Democrats erected . . . barriers to black suffrage” after the ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment); Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal
Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 542
(1993) (recognizing that “scholars widely acknowledge the historically racist motives
underlying criminal disenfranchisement”).
47
Behrens, supra note 15, at 237.
48
Id.
49
Id.
42
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resocialization of offenders who successfully served out their sentences. 50
Advocates saw criminal disenfranchisement provisions as a collateral
sentencing consequence that excluded offenders from society and increased
their likelihood of recidivism.51 Given that these provisions disenfranchised
an expressly defined group—individuals who had committed some
offense—advocates first alleged violations under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee that all people would receive “equal protection of
the laws.”52
B. FALLEN BRETHREN: PAST LEGAL CHALLENGES

In the 1960s, the Warren Court handed down a series of decisions
establishing the right to vote as “fundamental . . . in a free and democratic
society.”53 Access to the ballot box, the Court explained, “is a fundamental
political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.”54 The Court thus
required that any restriction of that right “must meet close constitutional
scrutiny.”55
Citing these cases, former inmates brought actions challenging state
disenfranchisement laws, arguing that the laws deprived them of the right to
vote protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.56 Although these suits were initially successful,57 courts were

50

Demleitner, supra note 7, at 766. The challenge came from a “broad alliance” of
unusual groups, including the National Conference on Uniform State Laws, the American
Law Institute, the National Probation and Parole Association, the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, and the President’s Commission on
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. Id.
51
Id.; see also Latimer, supra note 31, at 1845–46.
52
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
53
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). Professor John Hart Ely has
defended the Warren Court’s one person, one vote standard against criticism by arguing that
the Republican Form Clause (Section Four of Article IV), when read together with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutional amendments
further extending the franchise, supports the conclusion that all qualified citizens should play
a role in elections. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121–23 (1980).
54
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
55
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). The Dunn Court held that laws
affecting the right to vote, like other laws implicating fundamental rights, must assert a
compelling government interest and be “tailored to serve their legitimate objectives.” Id. at
343. In approaching such an analysis, the Court stated that it gives no deference to state
legislators when confronting a challenge to a citizen’s ability to participate in the franchise.
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1969).
56
See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451–52 (2d Cir. 1967); Fincher v.
Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117, 118–19 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff’d, 411 U.S. 961 (1973); Stephens v.
Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182, 1184–85 (D.N.J. 1970).
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generally reluctant to strike down felon disenfranchisement laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment.58 In Green v. Board of Elections, the Second
Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment59 and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges, citing John Locke and stating that “[a] man who
breaks the laws he has authorized his agent to make . . . could fairly have
been thought to have abandoned the right to participate in further
administering the compact.”60 The court found this social contract theory
sufficient to satisfy a rational basis test, which the court ruled was the
appropriate standard for the provision.61 The court also cited Section Two
of the Fourteenth Amendment,62 concluding that Section One could not
possibly outlaw an action explicitly permitted under Section Two.63
District courts outside of the Second Circuit embraced the Green
decision and quickly dismissed other challenges to criminal
disenfranchisement laws on the grounds that Section Two of the Fourteenth
Amendment conferred constitutional permission for such laws.64 Just two
years after Green, a district court in Florida noted that “excluding felons

57
Stephens, 327 F. Supp. at 1188 (finding that the state interest in protecting the “purity
of the electoral process” was not related to the “totally irrational and inconsistent
classification” used to disenfranchise in New Jersey).
58
Green, 380 F.2d at 452; Fincher, 352 F. Supp. at 119; Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F.
Supp. 71, 74 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla.
1969), aff’d, 396 U.S. 12 (1969).
59
See infra Part III for a more detailed analysis of the Green court’s holding that felon
disenfranchisement laws do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.
60
Green, 380 F.2d at 451.
61
Id. at 451–52.
62
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State,
or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, modified by U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1, and U.S. CONST.
amend. XXVI, § 1 (emphasis added).
63
Green, 380 F.2d at 452.
64
Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117, 119 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff’d, 411 U.S. 961 (1973);
Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 74 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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from the franchise has been so frequently recognized . . . that such
expressions cannot be dismissed as unconsidered dicta.”65
Lower courts’ reluctance to strike down felon disenfranchisement
provisions under the Equal Protection Clause greatly intensified after 1974,
when the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. Ramirez.66 Plaintiffs in
Richardson challenged California’s disenfranchisement law67 on the
grounds that it violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment.68 Plaintiffs argued that then-recent case law recognized the
right to vote as fundamental and required any state law denying or
inhibiting the exercise of the franchise to be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling state interest.69 The California Supreme Court found for the
plaintiffs, ruling that the state’s disenfranchisement provisions did not
rationally serve its proffered interest in protecting against election fraud.70
The Richardson Court disagreed and reversed. Instead, the Court
adopted the Second Circuit’s approach, finding that Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment provided an “affirmative sanction” of exclusion
from the franchise; without this sanction, disenfranchisement would be
vulnerable under the standard articulated by the earlier Warren Court in
decisions such as Dunn and Kramer.71 Instead of declaring any standard of
scrutiny for disenfranchisement laws, the Court implied that ex-offenders
could be deprived of access to the ballot box in any way for any reason. 72
Additionally, like the district court in Beacham v. Braterman,73 the
65

Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969), aff’d, 396 U.S. 12
(1969).
66
418 U.S. 24 (1974).
67
The California constitution at the time provided that “[l]aws shall be made to exclude
from voting persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other
high crimes” and that “no person convicted of any infamous crime . . . shall ever exercise the
privileges of an elector in this State.” CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 11, art. II, § 1.
68
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 33.
69
See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (“Statutes affecting
constitutional rights must be drawn with precision, and must be tailored to serve their
legitimate objectives.” (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (“[I]f a challenged state statute grants
the right to vote . . . to some otherwise qualified voters and denies it to others, the Court
must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state
interest.”); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (“Since the right to
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
70
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 80 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71
Id. at 54; see cases cited supra note 69.
72
See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
73
300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969), aff’d, 396 U.S. 12 (1969).

2012]

CIVIL DEATH IS DIFFERENT

451

Supreme Court noted that it had already “strongly suggested in dicta that
exclusion of convicted felons from the franchise violates no constitutional
provision.”74
Following Richardson, it seemed that the Supreme Court would not
strike down any felon disenfranchisement scheme for any reason.
However, in Hunter v. Underwood, Chief Justice Rehnquist—the author of
the earlier Richardson decision—modified his position and ruled that a
provision in the Alabama constitution disenfranchising those convicted of
“crimes of moral turpitude” was unconstitutional.75 The two Hunter
plaintiffs had both been convicted of presenting a worthless check, a
misdemeanor in the state.76 The Court found that lawmakers had enacted
the provision for the purpose of discriminating against African-Americans
and further found that it did discriminate in effect, thereby violating the
Equal Protection Clause.77 The Court retreated from its implication in
Richardson that no felon disenfranchisement law could ever be found to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.78 Hunter declared that although
depriving criminals as a group from access to the franchise is facially valid
under the Equal Protection Clause, states may not discriminate against any
protected class in the enactment or enforcement of such provisions.79
The Supreme Court’s language in Hunter encouraged other plaintiffs
to challenge various states’ disenfranchisement laws under a theory of
intentional racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
and the Voting Rights Act.80 Like many other claims of intentional racial
discrimination, these all failed.81
74
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53 (citing Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360
U.S. 45, 79 (1959)). But see Cosgrove, supra note 28, at 170 (arguing that but for Section
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, felon disenfranchisement schemes would be invalid
under the modern Fourteenth Amendment voting rights cases).
75
471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
76
Id. at 224.
77
Id. at 233.
78
See id.
79
Id. at 233.
80
See, e.g., Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that an
amendment to a state constitution removed the “taint” from the original version adopted to
intentionally discriminate against blacks); see also Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d
1214, 1223–24 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (same); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262
(6th Cir. 1986) (finding no discriminatory intent in the enactment of Tennessee’s
disenfranchisement statute).
81
See supra, note 80. Although the Supreme Court has never addressed a challenge to
felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act, all circuit courts that have addressed
the question have denied the claim. Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 41 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
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II. FITTING A NEW FRAMEWORK: CHALLENGING FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Previous challenges alleging intentional discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment and Voting Rights Act failed because, despite
being presented with overwhelming evidence of racially disparate
treatment, courts refused to find discriminatory animus by the state against
the individual plaintiffs.82 The plaintiffs mentioned above likewise failed to
conceptualize disenfranchisement provisions as barbaric, and contrary to
Trop v. Dulles and modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requiring
punishments to adhere to “evolving standards of decency.”83 Instead, a
more viable attack on felon disenfranchisement provisions could rely on the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.84
There is an existing precedent for a movement to litigate under the
Eighth Amendment when the courts have ruled the Fourteenth Amendment
does not apply: the most famous source of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, the death penalty.85 Although civil rights groups in the
1950s and 1960s enjoyed moderate success in the courts when challenging
412 (2010); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 323 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc); Johnson, 405
F.3d at 1234 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1261 (6th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a history of racial discrimination cannot “condemn action that is not in itself
unlawful” under the Voting Rights Act (internal quotations omitted)).
82
In Johnson, the plaintiffs produced a wealth of evidence regarding the history of
disenfranchisement in Florida. Brief of Plaintiffs–Appellants at 5–16, Johnson v. Governor
of Fla., 2004 WL 5467042 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (No. 02-14469C). Their evidence and
arguments traced the presence of discrimination from 1868, when Florida’s first
disenfranchisement provision was adopted to “discriminate[] against the newly freed slaves
and severely dilute[] their votes,” id. at 8, to the present use of the clemency process in the
state to exacerbate racial disparities, id. at 13 (“In 2000, African Americans were 43.3% of
the 9,750 applicants for restoration without a hearing, but only 29.2% of those determined
eligible and only 25.3% of those whose civil rights were ultimately restored.”). At the trial
level, plaintiffs introduced the testimony of numerous experts, virtually all of whom testified
about the racial effects of Florida’s disenfranchisement provision. See Plaintiffs’
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Clemency Board Members’ Motion to
Exclude Plaintiffs’ Witnesses and Evidence Identified Out-Of-Time at 1–3, Johnson v. Bush,
2002 WL 32495085 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (No. 00-3542-CIV). Incredibly, the plaintiff in Cotton
litigated his claim pro se from prison. Appellants, Pro Se, Brief at 1, Cotton v. Fordice, 1997
WL 33485007 (5th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-60275). Despite his incarceration, he nevertheless
presented the circuit court with a detailed history of racism in Mississippi and its connection
to the state’s disenfranchisement provision. Id. at 27–32. Indeed, the plaintiff’s evidence
was so strong that both the defendant and the court conceded that Mississippi’s
disenfranchisement provision was enacted for the purpose of discriminating against AfricanAmericans. Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d at 391.
83
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
84
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
85
STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 247 (2003).
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blatantly discriminatory laws under the Fourteenth Amendment,86 they were
altogether unsuccessful at challenging the death penalty under the Equal
Protection Clause.87 Then, in a dissent from the denial of certiorari in
Rudolph v. Alabama,88 Justice Arthur Goldberg proposed that the death
penalty might violate the “evolving standards of decency” prohibited under
the Eighth Amendment.89
Reacting to Goldberg’s dissent, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
(LDF) abandoned its Fourteenth Amendment approach and co-opted the
Eighth Amendment challenge.90 After winning a series of cases with
narrow holdings,91 LDF’s broader argument carried the day in Furman v.
Georgia, where the Supreme Court held Georgia’s death penalty
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.92 LDF’s argument—that
the rareness of the death penalty made the selection of eligible defendants
“arbitrary”—allowed some Justices in the majority to voice their concerns
about the discrimination present in the application of the death penalty,
even when those concerns were not based on intentional discrimination as
required for invalidation under the Equal Protection Clause.93

86

See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1953) (holding that restrictive covenants
segregating neighborhoods by race violated the Equal Protection Clause); McLaurin v. Okla.
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (finding a state law that provided different graduate
education for students based on race invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment).
87
Rudolph v. State, 152 So. 2d 662, 666 (Ala. 1963) (refusing to take judicial notice of
the discrimination present in the imposition of death sentences between black and white
defendants); State ex rel. Johnson v. Mayo, 69 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 1954) (ruling that
statistics showing a disparity in imposing the death sentence between black and white
defendants did not prove acts of discrimination); Williams v. State, 335 S.W.2d 224, 225–26
(Tex. 1960) (upholding the defendant’s sentence of death despite statistical evidence
showing the disparity in death sentences); Hampton v. Commonwealth, 58 S.E.2d 288, 298
(Va. 1950) (finding “not a scintilla of evidence” to support defendants’ claim of
discrimination).
88
375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
89
Id. at 890 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
90
BANNER, supra note 85, at 252.
91
See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521–22 (1968) (ruling that a state
cannot exclude jurors for expressing general objections to the death penalty); United States
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 (1968) (striking down the capital punishment clause of the
Federal Kidnapping Act as unconstitutional).
92
408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam). Furman was a 5-4 decision and all 9 justices
on the Court wrote separate opinions. Id.
93
BANNER, supra note 85, at 269. For example, Justice Douglas wrote in his
concurrence that “[i]n several instances where a white and a Negro were co-defendants, the
white was sentenced to life imprisonment or a term of years, and the Negro was given the
death penalty.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 251 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Indeed, the core value embodied by the Eighth Amendment makes it a
more appropriate avenue for a constitutional challenge to felon
disenfranchisement. From the beginning of modern Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court has said that the ban on cruel and unusual
punishment has a prospective scope and “may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”94 In Trop v. Dulles, the
seminal Eighth Amendment case, the Court announced that the Amendment
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.”95 The Trop Court envisioned the
Eighth Amendment as evolutionary, where a form of punishment once
unquestioned might be viewed by future generations as outside the limits of
civilized standards and constitutionally impermissible.96 By contrast, the
Equal Protection Clause generally requires a plaintiff to show that the state
intended to engage in invidious discrimination when it first acted in the
field.97 Once a court has ruled that the law’s creation was not tainted with a
racially discriminatory purpose, stare decisis demands that the ruling be
respected unless it is proven unworkable.98
Because of the prospective nature of the Trop decision,99 courts can
feel freer to modify past rulings to adjust to current popular practices and
opinions.100 Moreover, these modifications largely push judicial decisions
one way: “as moral sentiments become more refined—as the frame of
reference for humanity and compassion expands—the range of
constitutionally permissible punishment diminishes.”101 The Supreme

94

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (internal citations omitted).
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (emphasis added).
96
Id. at 100.
97
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976). The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
further require that a plaintiff must show not only that the state’s original legislative action
was motivated by impermissible discrimination, but also that any amendment to or
modification of that law was similarly adopted with discriminatory intent. Johnson v.
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1224 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Cotton v. Fordice, 157
F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 1998).
98
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (plurality opinion).
99
Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
100
See William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth
Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1355, 1384 (2005).
101
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). The notable exception to this one-way street
of Eighth Amendment interpretation is the death penalty (once again). In Furman v.
Georgia, the Court invalidated Georgia’s death penalty law, ruling that its “imposition . . .
constitute[s] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.” 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). Four years later, however, the Court in Gregg
v. Georgia upheld Troy Gregg’s sentence of death for a murder conviction. 428 U.S. 153,
158, 207 (1976).
95
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Court, recognizing the potential arbitrariness that might result from such a
free-wheeling mandate, has attempted to rein in this power by looking for
“objective evidence of contemporary values,” as evidenced by “legislation
enacted by the country’s legislatures.”102
However, the Court
simultaneously reserves the right to exercise its own judgment on what
practices are cruel and unusual.103
Past case law demonstrates that the Supreme Court is perhaps more
willing to modify its earlier rulings in the context of Eighth Amendment
litigation than any other constitutional challenge. In Atkins v. Virginia,104
the Court ruled that imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded
criminals was cruel and unusual, directly overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, a
case it decided just thirteen years earlier.105 Similarly, the Court announced
in Roper v. Simmons106 that juveniles could no longer be constitutionally
sentenced to death, reversing Stanford v. Kentucky,107 decided by the Court
sixteen years earlier.108 Thus, when it comes to Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court seems more willing to consider changing
conditions and social attitudes, notwithstanding its own past statements
regarding the legitimacy of a form of punishment, and question the
punishment anew.
It may seem surprising, then, that more scholars have not argued that
the Eighth Amendment is the proper channel for a challenge to felon
disenfranchisement schemes.109
However, given the quite recent
102
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 331 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). This “independent judgment,” though
continually invoked by the Court, has never been used to strike down a form of punishment
that did not meet the evolving standards comparison, using legislative action or popular
opinion as evidence. Heffernan, supra note 100, at 1380–81.
104
Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
105
Penry, 492 U.S. at 322, 335 (holding that failure to instruct the jury that it could
consider mitigating evidence of defendant’s mental retardation was cruel and unusual, but
that sentencing a mentally retarded man to death, per se, was not), overruled by Atkins, 536
U.S. at 314–15 (finding that “[m]uch has changed since [Penry],” including the fact that
states post-Penry overwhelmingly provided additional protections for mentally retarded
defendants facing the death penalty).
106
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
107
492 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (ruling that because a majority of the states with capital
punishment regimes allow defendants sixteen or older to face a possible sentence of death,
the practice was not unusual and did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
108
Roper, 543 U.S. at 566 (finding a significant decrease in states allowing juveniles to
be sentenced to death, although noting that this decrease was not as substantial as in Atkins).
109
See, e.g., Cosgrove, supra note 28 (arguing that the language of Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies only to male offenders and that the Nineteenth Amendment
repealed this Section); Liles, supra note 17 (discussing the future of such challenges under
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developments foreclosing the Voting Rights Act as a viable method to
challenging these laws,110 and given the fact that until 2010, the Court’s
main Eighth Amendment jurisprudence focused largely on the death
penalty,111 a viable challenge construing felon disenfranchisement as cruel
and unusual under the Eighth Amendment has seemed unlikely until now.
In Rummel v. Estelle, the Court went so far as to say that “[o]utside the
context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality
of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.”112
Then, in May 2010, the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida113
and reconstrued the “death is different” jurisprudence into a more expansive

the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act); Shapiro, supra note 46 (arguing that
such challenges should be made under the Voting Rights Act). But see Thompson, supra
note 8, at 199–201 (advocating that felon disenfranchisement is cruel and unusual under
Justice Brennan’s four principles espoused in Furman v. Georgia); Pamela A. Wilkins, The
Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised Felons and the Constitutional No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 85, 136–43 (2005) (exploring the possibility of an Eighth Amendment challenge to
felon disenfranchisement).
110
Indeed, until October 7, 2010, the Ninth Circuit maintained that the Voting Rights Act
did preclude Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law, creating a circuit split on the issue.
Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 990–91 (9th Cir. 2010).
111
Considering all the Eighth Amendment challenges to defendants’ criminal sentences,
it seems that since Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Supreme Court has been
much more sympathetic to attacks on the death penalty. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana,
554 U.S. 407, 446–47 (2008) (finding it unconstitutional to sentence a defendant to death for
the crime of rape of a child that did not result in death); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930,
934–35 (2007) (ruling that criminals may not be executed if they are incapable of
understanding the reason for their imminent execution); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding that
juveniles may not be sentenced to death); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306–07 (2002)
(stating that mentally retarded defendants may not be sentenced to death); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (finding it unconstitutional to sentence a defendant to
death for aiding and abetting a felony wherein a murder is committed by others without any
intent on the part of the defendant); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (ruling that
a sentence of death for the rape of an adult woman was cruel and unusual).
By contrast, Eighth Amendment challenges to other criminal sentences as
disproportionate to the crime largely fail. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31
(2003) (holding that California’s three strikes law was not cruel and unusual); Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995–96 (1991) (finding that although a sentence to life without
parole for a first-time offender may be cruel, it is not unusual and therefore does not violate
the Eighth Amendment); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 283–84 (1980) (ruling that a
mandatory life sentence following a defendant’s third felony conviction, this time for
obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, was not cruel and unusual). The sole exception to this
peculiar history is Solem v. Helm, where the Court ruled that a sentence of life without parole
for the crime of writing a check from a fake account did constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983).
112
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.
113
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
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view of the Eighth Amendment.114 The Court ruled that juvenile offenders
who have been convicted of non-homicidal crimes may not be sentenced to
life without the possibility of parole. For the first time in the Court’s
history, it created a categorical exclusion under the Eighth Amendment that
did not involve the penalty of death.115 The Court reinvigorated Trop’s
“precept[s] of justice” and “evolving standards of decency” language,
applying it outside of the capital punishment context.116
Most notably, the Graham Court recharacterized the distinction
between a “gross proportionality” analysis and a categorical exclusion
analysis.117 Previously, most courts had applied the gross proportionality
analysis to all sentences not implicating the death penalty.118 This analysis
“does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence” and
“forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the
crime.”119 The gross proportionality analysis is heavily fact-centered,
taking into account all of the circumstances of the case at hand and
inquiring whether the exact punishment imposed is excessive.120
Challenges in cases analyzed under the “gross proportionality” requirement
are widely unsuccessful and, even when the offender does prevail, so factspecific that they rarely apply outside of the instant case.121 In fact, there
have been just three instances where the Supreme Court has found the
punishment in question cruel and unusual under a gross proportionality
analysis, and none since 1983.122
The Graham Court, however, construed the challenged punishment as
part of a larger categorical challenge and subjected it to a much more
114

See generally Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011. Commentators have credited the origin of
the “death is different” phrase to Justice Stewart, who wrote in his concurring opinion in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring), that “[t]he penalty of
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment . . . .” See, e.g., Daniel Ross
Harris, Note, Capital Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat from the “Death Is
Different” Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1389, 1390 n.7 (1991); Rory K. Little, The Federal
Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 364 n.79 (1999).
115
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
116
Id. at 2021.
117
Id. at 2022.
118
See Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Commentary, Redemption Song: Graham v.
Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSION 86, 87 (2010).
119
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (internal quotation omitted).
120
See Smith & Cohen, supra note 118, at 87.
121
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
122
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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searching analysis.123 Under the modified categorical exclusion analysis,
the Court asked whether the general punishment in question (life without
the possibility of parole) was permissibly imposed on the offenders in
question (juveniles convicted of non-homicidal crimes).124 Having framed
the issue, the Court employed the standards used in previous death penalty
cases.
Smith and Cohen observe that, whether or not this move by the Court
was wise, the characterization “appears poised to stay.”125 Thus, the next
portion of this Comment follows the steps of analysis articulated by the
Graham Court and shows how one state’s felon disenfranchisement scheme
might successfully be challenged by arguing that it imposes cruel and
unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
III. A LIFE SENTENCE: CHALLENGING VIRGINIA’S DISENFRANCHISEMENT
PROVISION AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
Generally speaking, when courts confront Eighth Amendment
challenges to a state practice or law, they typically take most seriously
challenges to the most draconian or extreme form of that practice. In the
context of the juvenile justice system, advocates first worked to exempt
juveniles from the death penalty126 before challenging their sentences of life
without the possibility of parole for non-homicidal crimes.127 As Smith and
Cohen note, it was the convergence of reasoning in Roper128 and Kennedy v.
Louisiana129 that allowed the Court in Graham to find a constitutional
violation.130 In other words, but for Roper, there would be no Graham.131
In the context of disenfranchisement, attacking the practice wholesale
will likely result in immediate dismissal from most courts.132 Instead, a
123

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010). Justices Thomas and Scalia noted
the Court’s innovation and departure from the “death is different” distinction, declaring it
“especially mystifying when one considers how long it has resisted crossing that divide.” Id.
at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124
Id. at 2039 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
125
Smith & Cohen, supra note 118, at 89.
126
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
127
Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011.
128
Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
129
554 U.S. 407 (2008).
130
Smith & Cohen, supra note 118, at 91–92.
131
Id.
132
There are several reasons, both practical and legal, why a court would not take such a
challenge seriously. In its broadest form, forty-eight states deprive some felons of the right
to vote for some period of time. See infra Part III.C. Most courts that have addressed an
Eighth Amendment challenge to felon disenfranchisement wholesale have given it short
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serious challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws will begin with the most
draconian forms of those laws, found in just four states—Iowa,133 Florida,134
Kentucky,135 and Virginia.136 For reasons explained in Part B, this
Comment’s analysis of the Graham test will focus on the sweeping
disenfranchisement provision found in the Virginia constitution.
A. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION ANALYSIS

Before a court will analyze a state or federal law for Eighth
Amendment violations, petitioners must clear a threshold hurdle: they must
establish that the law in question is indeed punishment and not merely a
regulation.137 If the court finds a law to be merely a regulation of the field,
this ends the Eighth Amendment inquiry, as its focus is punishments.138
If a petitioner successfully persuades a court that the
disenfranchisement provision is indeed punitive, he or she must satisfy
every step of the categorical exclusion analysis. Under the categorical
exclusion analysis articulated by the Graham Court, a court considering any
challenge to a category of punishment must first consider the “objective
indicia of society’s standards.”139 In so doing, it will conduct a survey of
state legislation and sentencing practices to determine whether a “national
consensus against the sentencing practice at issue” exists.140
Next, a court must make its own independent judicial determination as
to whether the punishment is prohibited under the Eighth Amendment,
using the provision’s “text, history, meaning, and purpose.”141 In the
context of felon disenfranchisement, the court should: (a) consider the
offender’s characteristics to determine whether the particular class of
offenders in question has some common characteristic rendering those
offenders less deserving of punishment than offenders at large, and (b)
shrift, disposing of the claim quickly. See, e.g., Theiss v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws
of Md., 387 F. Supp. 1038, 1041–42 (D. Md. 1974); Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117, 119
(M.D.N.C. 1972); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 74 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
133
IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5.
134
FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
135
KY. CONST. § 145.
136
VA. CONST. art. II, § 1. See Erika Wood, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RESTORING THE
RIGHT TO VOTE 3 (2d ed. 2009); see also Wendy R. Weiser & Lawrence Norden, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, VOTING LAW CHANGES IN 2012, at 34–36 (2011).
137
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167–69 (1963).
138
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93–94 (2003).
139
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 563 (2005)).
140
Id. at 2023.
141
Id. at 2022 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008)).
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analyze the nature of the offense to determine whether it is less deserving of
punishment than other offenses punished in the same way.142 The court
should also consider the nature of the punishment, to see how it compares
against other possible punishments and the penological justification for it,
to determine whether any legitimate justification exists.143 As to the last
factor, if the court finds no legitimate penal objective, the sentence in
question “is by its nature disproportionate to the offense” and must be
invalidated under the Eighth Amendment.144
Finally, the court may look to how the practices of the punishment
within the United States compare to the practices within other countries
around the world.145 Although the Graham Court did look to international
sentencing practices to support its finding,146 an international comparison
can only lend support and should not itself be considered dispositive on the
issue of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.147
B. LIFETIME FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IS PUNITIVE AND NOT
REGULATORY

As a threshold issue, a party bringing a claim against felon
disenfranchisement must establish that the law in question is punitive in
order to invoke the protections of the Eighth Amendment.148
In Trop v. Dulles, the Court mentioned in passing that unlike the
revocation of citizenship, where the effects are so drastic that it can only be
punitive in nature, revocation of access to the voting franchise might
142

Id. at 2026–27.
Id. at 2026–28.
144
Id. at 2028.
145
Id. at 2033–34.
146
Id.
147
The debate over the appropriate role that international law should play in American
constitutional jurisprudence is far outside the bounds of this Comment. Suffice it to say that
Justice Thomas notes his bitter disagreement with the majority’s choice to employ
comparisons with foreign jurisdictions, “confining to a footnote” his belief that “such factors
are irrelevant to the meaning of our Constitution or the Court’s discernment of any
longstanding tradition in this nation.” Id. at 2053 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
148
In Smith v. Doe, the Court explained how it distinguished between regulatory and
punitive schemes:
143

If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however,
the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further
examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the
state’s] intention to deem it civil. Because we ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent,
only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.

538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).
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legitimately “designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting,” and
could thus be sustained as a “nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the
franchise.”149 Although this statement was dicta and posed as a simple
hypothetical,150 the Court gave it more force in Lassiter v. Northampton
County Board of Elections, when it stated that “[r]esidence requirements,
age, [and] previous criminal record are obvious examples indicating factors
which a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications
of voters.”151 These statements, taken together, have been enough to
convince some courts that felon disenfranchisement is regulatory, not
punitive, and therefore not subject to the dictates of the Eighth
Amendment.152
However, given subsequent developments in conceptions of the right
to vote, Professor Pamela Karlan argues that these prior decisions were
based on an outdated understanding that states had plenary power to
regulate the franchise, including regulating by disqualifying those who were
“practically hostile” to established moral values.153 The Court repudiated
the “hostility to moral values” view in Carrington v. Rash, striking down
laws that denied the right to vote to “persons advocating a certain
practice.”154
But arguing the inapplicability of the statements in Trop and Lassiter
in the face of Carrington will at best create a blank slate as to the regulatory
or punitive function of felon disenfranchisement laws. Further proof that
the disenfranchisement provision is punitive must still be given. To that
end, the Reconstruction Act of 1870155 provides forceful evidence that
Virginia’s constitutional provision disenfranchising felons must be punitive.
The Reconstruction Act of 1870 was one of four acts passed to readmit
the eleven ex-Confederate states into the Union.156 The Act requires:

149

356 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1959).
Wilkins, supra note 109, at 102 (“[T]he Court invoked a hypothetical statute from a
hypothetical jurisdiction, then assumed (without examining the history of the hypothetical
statute or of disenfranchisement practices in the hypothetical jurisdiction) that the
hypothetical statute’s purpose was to regulate the franchise.”).
151
360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
152
Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967); Beacham v. Braterman,
300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969), aff’d, 396 U.S. 12 (1969).
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Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the
Debate of Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1150–51 (2004).
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380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
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Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62.
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Act of Feb. 27, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67 (readmitting Mississippi); 16 Stat. 62
(readmitting Virginia); Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73 (readmitting North Carolina,
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That the State of Virginia is admitted to representation in Congress as one of the
States of the Union upon the following fundamental conditions: First, That the
Constitution of Virginia shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any
citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the right to vote who are entitled to
vote by the Constitution herein recognized, except as a punishment for such crimes as
are now felonies at common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted under
157
laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State.

The Virginia Constitution, including the felon disenfranchisement
provision, was subsequently ratified in 1870.158 Therefore, the Act required
that any disenfranchisement provision enacted in Virginia must be for the
purpose of punishment,159 or else Virginia would, in effect, be violating the
terms upon which it was readmitted into the Union.
Invoking the Reconstruction Act as dispositive proof that Virginia’s
lifetime felon disenfranchisement provision is punitive forces the state into
a sort of catch-22. If the state argues that its constitutional provision is
merely regulatory, then the Act functions as an alteration made by Congress
to a state’s federal election laws, as permitted by Article I, Section Four of
the Constitution.160 If the state instead avoids this argument and does not

South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida); Act of June 22, 1868, ch. 69, 15
Stat. 72 (readmitting Arkansas).
Florida’s Reconstruction Act, with language nearly identical to the one applicable to
Virginia, may allow for a similar challenge to be brought against the state of Florida. 15
Stat. 73. However, Florida only recently began imposing lifetime disenfranchisement for all
convicted felons. David Ruppe, Florida Changes Controversial Voting Policy, ABC NEWS,
Mar. 26, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=93730&page=1&singlePage=true
#.T0RQbXKXSs4. While the state constitution authorizes the state’s sweeping
disenfranchisement provision, see FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, the state had previously provided
for automatic restoration of some individuals previously convicted of felonies. See Ari
Berman, The GOP War on Voting, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 15, 2011, at 49. In March 2011,
however, after just thirty minutes of public debate, Republican Governor Rick Scott
overturned that streamlined process. Id. (noting that the change instantly disenfranchised
97,491 individuals and precluded another 1.1 million individuals from being allowed to vote
after completing their sentences). Given the infancy of the state’s disenfranchisement
provision, as well as the special attention given to the issue in Florida (the state’s application
of its disenfranchisement provision became a controversial issue during the 2000
Presidential election), this Comment will not address how such an alternative challenge
might succeed.
157
16 Stat. 62 (emphasis added).
158
VA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
159
See 16 Stat. 62. The Act also requires that Virginia limit its disenfranchisement
scheme to those crimes that were at the time “felonies at common law.” Id. This presents a
strong alternative argument, but as it has no bearing on an Eighth Amendment claim, I will
not address it here.
160
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof,
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challenge petitioner’s contention that the disenfranchisement provision is
punitive, then no invocation of the Act is necessary and the analysis can
move on to the next phase.
One pre-Voting Rights Act case in Virginia casts doubt on the validity
of the Reconstruction Act and is worth rebutting here. In Butler v.
Thompson, a black woman brought suit in federal court seeking an order to
compel Virginia to register her as a voter despite her failure to pay the
state’s poll tax.161 The court rejected her claim, questioning whether the
state’s failure to comply with certain conditions was justiciable in the courts
and whether the Act was even valid at all.162 The court suggested that the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Texas v. White, that the Confederate States were
never legally outside the Union, obviated any need for readmission.163
Finally, the court stated that the Act must not unduly restrict the election
laws of Virginia in order to have any force, since “the constitutional duty of
guaranteeing each state a republican form of government gives Congress no
power in admitting a state to impose a restriction which would operate to
deprive that state of equality with other states.”164
In contrast, numerous federal courts have applied the Reconstruction
Act of 1870 without mention of any genuine validity issues.165 The
Supreme Court itself, in Richardson v. Ramirez, cited the Reconstruction
Acts favorably.166 Second, the argument that Congress may not treat states
unequally appears to have been answered when the Supreme Court, in
Bartlett v. Strickland, upheld the constitutionality of Section Five of the
Voting Rights Act, which requires federal approval for redistricting
decisions in nine specified states.167
Thus, it appears that the Reconstruction Act of 1870 is valid and does
have force. As such, its mandate that Virginia may only disenfranchise
felons for a punitive purpose should be respected by a court, and section
one of article II in the Virginia constitution should be construed as punitive.
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators.”).
161
Butler v. Thompson, 97 F. Supp. 17, 20–21 (E.D. Va. 1951).
162
Id. at 19.
163
Id. at 20 (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 721 (1868)).
164
Id. at 21 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 570 (1911)).
165
E.g., Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that Section
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment was not limited to felonies at common law when it was
ratified because where Congress wished to place such a limitation, it did so explicitly);
Coronado v. Napolitano, No. CV 07-1089-PHX-SMM, 2008 WL 191987, at *8 (D. Ariz.
Jan. 22, 2008) (same).
166
418 U.S. 24, 49–51 (1974).
167
556 U.S. 1 (2009).
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C. OBJECTIVE INDICIA DEMONSTRATE A NATIONAL CONSENSUS
AGAINST IMPOSING INDISCRIMINATE LIFETIME FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT

Once a law is construed as punitive, the court may properly subject it
to an Eighth Amendment analysis. The Court, in Graham v. Florida,
articulated that any categorical exclusion analysis must begin by
establishing a “national consensus” through “objective evidence of . . . the
legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”168 In the context of felon
disenfranchisement, only four states—Iowa, Florida, Kentucky,169 and
Virginia170—now exclude individuals convicted at any time of any felony
from the franchise for life.171 Although forty-eight states deprive some
felons of the right to vote for some period of time, no other states provide
the combination of permanency and breadth present in these four states’
constitutional provisions.172 Thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia currently allow felons to be re-enfranchised at least upon
completion of their sentences; two states, Maine and Vermont, currently
allow felons to vote even while they are incarcerated.173 The remaining
seven states174 impose lifetime disenfranchisement upon conviction of
specifically enumerated felonies or upon conviction of a felony for the
second time.175
However, as the Graham Court recognized, “[t]here are measures of
consensus other than legislation,” such as actual sentencing practices.176
Here, too, Virginia stands out as one of the most extreme examples of felon

168

130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022–23 (2010).
KY. CONST. § 145.
170
VA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
171
Wood, supra note 136, at 3.
172
Id.
173
Of these thirty-seven states, five states (California, Colorado, Connecticut, New York,
and South Dakota) allow felons on probation to vote, and thirteen states (Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Utah) and the District of Columbia allow those on
probation or parole to vote. Id.
174
The remaining seven states are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, Nevada,
Tennessee, and Wyoming. Id.
175
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS ACROSS THE
UNITED STATES 2–3, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_
48642.pdf. See infra note 186 for a discussion of states that have recently abolished
disenfranchisement schemes identical to those found in Kentucky and Virginia.
176
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022–23 (2010) (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana,
554 U.S. 407, 421–22 (2008)).
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disenfranchisement.177 Virginia’s provision currently deprives 377,847
residents, or 6.8% of its population, from access to the ballot box.178 In
comparison, the only states with figures that exceed or approximate
Virginia’s are Texas (which currently disenfranchises 522,887 individuals)
and Florida (which currently disenfranchises 1,179,687 individuals).179
While the raw number of disenfranchised individuals is greater in Texas
than in Virginia, the Texas figure represents only 3.3% of the state’s
population.180 Furthermore, Texas deprives its felons of access only while
they are completing their sentences, and thus, most of those who currently
cannot vote will regain suffrage at some point in the future.181
Finally, the Court in Atkins v. Virginia182 and Roper v. Simmons183
noted that another important factor in an Eighth Amendment analysis
regarding the presence of a “national consensus” is the history and
substance of recent state action regarding the punishment in question.184
Just as the Court in those decisions recognized the consistency of the
direction of change in the state legislatures, here, too, there has been a
largely one-way movement of states addressing their felon
disenfranchisement provisions.185 In just a thirteen-year period from 1997
to 2010, twenty-three states reformed their felon disenfranchisement laws in
various ways to make the franchise more accessible to ex-felons.186 As the
Atkins Court observed, “[g]iven the well-known fact that anticrime
legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for
persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting . . .
[the punishment in question] provides powerful evidence that today our
society[’s] views” have changed.187 Moreover, there is direct evidence that
177
SENTENCING PROJECT, INTERACTIVE MAP, http://www.sentencingproject.org/map/
map.cfm#map (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
536 U.S. 304, 314 (2002).
183
543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005).
184
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315–16.
185
NICOLE D. PORTER, SENTENCING PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: STATE FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM, 1997–2010, at 4–5 (2010),
available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/vr_ExpandingtheVoteFinal
Addendum.pdf.
186
Id.
For example, nine states either abandoned or modified lifetime
disenfranchisement laws, including Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska,
and New Mexico. Id. Eight more simplified their restoration processes for qualified people
seeking to have their voting rights restored. Id. at 1.
187
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315–16.
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the population at large disapproves of lifetime disenfranchisement.
According to a poll conducted by the Center for Survey Research and
Analysis in 2001, only 18 percent of respondents supported permanent
disenfranchisement of felons.188
All of this evidence indicates that in the context of a challenge to
Virginia’s lifetime disenfranchisement provision, a national consensus has
emerged against the imposition of this punishment.
D. LIFETIME DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF ALL FELONS HAS NO
LEGITIMATE PUNITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS

However, the Graham Court stressed that a national consensus would
not itself determine the standards of what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment, stating that “the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment
remains [the judiciary’s] responsibility.”189 Under this analysis, the Court
will examine the nature of the offender, the offense, and the punishment all
separately and comparatively.190 Because felons as a general group do not
evoke the kind of sympathy that other groups like juveniles or the mentally
handicapped do, and because the set of felonies in Virginia encompasses
everything from possession of a certain amount of marijuana191 to
premeditated murder, it is unlikely that presenting the general group as
somehow having less culpability would succeed.192
However, the court will also consider separately whether the
punishment serves legitimate penal goals.193 In the context of a claim
against Virginia’s disenfranchisement provision, petitioners will have to
show that the state’s law does not serve any of the four traditional
legitimate penological aims: rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence, and
retribution.194
188

See also PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., OPEN SOC’Y INST., CHANGING
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 14
(2002), available at http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/Hart-Poll.pdf (finding that 68%
of respondents “strongly favor” or “somewhat favor” reenfranchising people with felony
convictions after they are released from prison).
189
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
190
Id.
191
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-9 to -11 (2009).
192
In Graham, petitioners were able to present a group of sympathetic plaintiffs
(juveniles) being subjected to the second-worst punishment available (life in prison without
the possibility of parole) for a group of crimes that specifically excluded the worst (nonhomicide offenses). Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–28.
193
Id. at 2026.
194
Id. at 2028–30 (noting that “[a] sentence lacking any penological justification is by its
nature disproportionate to the offense” and therefore unconstitutional).
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It is clear that any lifetime felon disenfranchisement cannot serve
legitimate rehabilitative ends. Similar to the sentence in Graham, a
sentence of lifetime removal from suffrage “forswears altogether the
rehabilitative ideal.”195 The Court in Graham suggested that a decision that
characterizes a group irredeemable and deprives them of the option of
redemption would be met with suspicion.196
Nor can lifetime disenfranchisement be justified under a theory of
incapacitation. Overall, it is unlikely that anyone would seriously argue
that depriving a felon of the right to vote somehow will prevent her from
committing some future criminal offense unrelated to voting.197 Yet, the
real effect of this penological justification draws on the moral desire to
protect the purity of the ballot box.198 Even in the context of voting, this
justification carries no weight.199
As Karlan discusses, the actual
occurrence of voting fraud is low and rarely determinative in an election.200
Moreover, when analyzing how many of those convicted of voting fraud
have previously been convicted of a felony, the number dwindles to nearly
zero.201 Due to the technological advances in the way citizens vote, it is
likely that election fraud may no longer pose a serious danger.202
Furthermore, even if election fraud is a sufficient danger to warrant
disenfranchisement, Virginia’s provision disenfranchising all felons
regardless of the crime reaches much further than necessary to prevent any
fraud.203 Indeed, the disconnect becomes apparent when comparing an
individual convicted of possessing a large amount of marijuana, who is
disenfranchised for life, with an individual convicted of a fraud-related
crime, who will not lose his vote if the fraud was a misdemeanor.
Like the argument for incapacitation, the argument for lifetime
disenfranchisement under a deterrence theory generally falls flat.204
Realistically, it is unlikely that a would-be criminal, undeterred by the
threat of long-term incarceration, limited freedom afterward on parole, and
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Id. at 2030.
See id.; see also Smith & Cohen, supra note 118, at 93.
197
See Karlan, supra note 153, at 1167.
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See Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and “The
Purity of the Ballot Box,” 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1314 (1989).
199
Karlan, supra note 153, at 1167.
200
Id. at 1169.
201
Id. at 1167.
202
Thompson, supra note 8, at 190.
203
Id.
204
Karlan, supra note 153, at 1166.
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the imposition of fines, would choose to abstain from crime based solely on
the prospect that he would lose his ability to vote.205
Thus, the only justification for lifetime disenfranchisement is under a
retributive theory.206 However, the Graham Court is careful to note that
while retribution is a legitimate reason to punish, “the heart of the
retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to
the personal culpability of the criminal offender.”207 As Professor Karlan
has observed, “[a] categorical disenfranchisement of all ex-offenders
convicted of a felony lumps together crimes of vastly different gravity,” and
thus offenders without a high degree of blameworthy conduct, such as mere
possession of cocaine,208 are given the same punishment with the same
justification as offenders with the highest degree of blameworthy conduct,
such as those convicted of murder.209 Although no precise degree of
proportionality is required under an Eighth Amendment analysis, it is likely
that a court will find that the complete lack of any proportionality renders
Virginia’s disenfranchisement provision invalid under a retributive
penological justification.
E. WHEN COMPARED AGAINST INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES,
VIRGINIA’S LIFETIME DISENFRANCHISEMENT PROVISION FOR
ALL FELONIES APPEARS EVEN MORE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL

The Court in Graham looked to the international community to
evaluate the cruelty and unusualness of Florida’s sentencing practice.210
The Court insisted, however, that “[t]he judgments of other nations and the
international community are not dispositive as to the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment,” but merely relevant in assessing how far-reaching the
consensus is against the challenged punishment.211
In the present case, the United States and Belgium are the only two
countries among Western industrial nations to deny felons access to the
205
Id. Moreover, there is some evidence that suggests that disenfranchisement, when
considered with other collateral consequences to conviction, actually increases the chances
that a previously convicted individual will reoffend. See Raymond Paternoster, How Much
Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 820
(2010) (arguing that obstacles to reentry, imposed because of the conviction, “decreas[e] the
utility of non-offending” and explain the low deterrence effect of even long-term
incarceration).
206
Karlan, supra note 153, at 1166.
207
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (citations omitted).
208
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-255.2 (2009).
209
Karlan, supra note 153, at 1167.
210
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033.
211
Id.
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franchise for life.212 Furthermore, the United States is the only country that
permits disenfranchisement based on a category as broad as “all
felonies.”213 In the mid-1960s, most of Europe questioned the practice of
disenfranchisement altogether, and several countries enacted reforms to
allow felons greater access to the ballot.214 This movement has accelerated
in recent years, as various courts have removed many limitations on the
access to the ballot.215 As the Sentencing Project noted in its 2007 report,
Barriers to Democracy, “The United States’ policy of criminal
disenfranchisement is extreme by every metric, and there is compelling
need for reform.”216
The Court stated in Graham:
the laws and practices of other nations and international agreements [are] relevant to
the Eighth Amendment not because those norms are binding or controlling but
because the judgment of the world’s nations that a particular sentencing practice is
inconsistent with basic principles of decency demonstrates that the Court’s rationale
217
has respected reasoning to support it.

In the present context, we see how out of step Virginia is when compared
with the rest of the world.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although previous case law implicitly foreclosed all challenges to
felon disenfranchisement laws, there is a silver lining to be found in the
“evolving standards” guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.
This
guarantee carried the day in Graham v. Florida, and consequently, the
Court reinvigorated the view of the Eighth Amendment as a rising bar.
Furthermore, the Court in Graham rearticulated the previous “death is
different” jurisprudence, expanding its scope under the Eighth Amendment.
In so doing, the Court opened the door for a lifetime felon
disenfranchisement claim under a more exacting scrutiny than would have
been available before Graham.
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In the context of Virginia’s permanent disenfranchisement of all
felons, petitioners may have success launching an attack on Virginia’s law
in the wake of Graham. Given the Reconstruction Act of 1870, the state
would have a difficult time arguing that its disenfranchisement provision is
regulatory, not punitive. Surviving this threshold issue will allow a
petitioner to point to the recent reform amongst the majority of the states to
include more ex-offenders on their voting rolls. Moreover, strong
arguments support the position that permanent disenfranchisement for all
felonies (certainly a wide range of crimes given the complexities of the
modern penal code) cannot rationally serve any legitimate penological goal.
In assessing whether the provision runs afoul of the Eighth
Amendment’s guarantee of protection from “cruel and unusual
punishments,” a court may wish to consider international opinions on
permanent disenfranchisement of felons.
Because the international
community has largely condemned disenfranchisement, this inquiry will
only serve to bolster this claim.
If a petitioner can successfully challenge one of the two harshest felon
disenfranchisement provisions in court, the long march toward true
universal suffrage may begin. With an estimated 5.3 million men and
women in the United States currently unable to speak with their ballot
because of a past conviction,218 we must extend the franchise to all citizens
including those convicted of a felony before we can realize true political
equality. As the Supreme Court noted in Gray v. Sanders, “[t]he
conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one
vote.”219
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